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1. Introduction. 23 
Pain is a protective strategy, which emerges from on-going interaction between body 24 
and world. Pain is, however, often thought of as a unitary output—an end product 25 
experienced as an intrusion upon an often unsuspecting perceiver [56]. We know a lot 26 
about how nociception relates to pain, informed by both biological and psychological 27 
influences [30,70,98], about how pain intrudes into awareness [5,26,29,34], and how 28 
it relates to clinical variables such as suffering and disability [35]. However, despite 29 
significant advances, the mechanisms of pain intrusion remain elusive [63]. In this 30 
paper we stress a functional view of pain as more than experience; as defensive action 31 
operating in the context of uncertain threat. 32 
 33 
Although traditional characterisations of perception as a product of sensory information 34 
have been critiqued [19,41,53], including in pain [89,96], there is now a well advanced 35 
contemporary view that all perception is embodied and embedded [41,67,79,88]. Here, 36 
embodied is defined by action, the premise that cognition extends beyond the brain 37 
so that an ever-changing body is at the core of how our experiences are shaped; this 38 
may be the unconscious workings of our immune system or the collaborative efforts 39 
made to avoid movement. Embedded refers to the situated interaction between the 40 
embodied being and the external environment, in both place (current context) and time 41 
(evolutionary context). 42 
 43 
From this view, all experience is inferential [78], dynamic [22,55], and related to action 44 
in the world [2,21,24]. Thus, to describe the experience of pain we must understand it 45 
within its evolved, learned, and ultimately threat-defined context [33,101]. Theories of 46 
embodied experience are well advanced elsewhere, most notably in cybernetics 47 
[4,23,81], evolutionary biology [39,75,82] and consciousness [83,84]. Its provenance 48 
can be traced to structural psychology [93], phenomenology [47,53,62], and perception 49 
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[41,77]. However, embodied domains have avoided pain, considering it either too 50 
simple [32] or paradoxically too difficult [6].  51 
 52 
Our embodied view, in many ways complements existing literature [18,27,36,42,97] 53 
supporting the growing understanding of pain as an experience inferred from uncertain 54 
information [3,17,85,100]. However, it critically looks to extend this work beyond a 55 
passive, information processing model that has come to dominate [49].  Here, we 56 
emphasise the body, not separate from the brain nor the world, but part of the facility 57 
that actively shapes our experience of pain. This perspective defines pain in terms of 58 
action: an experience which, as part of a protective strategy, attempts to defend one’s 59 
self in the presence of inferred threat.  60 
 61 
We start with a consideration of the core features of embodied pain. Next, we review 62 
the few studies that have been attempted on embodied perception and pain. Finally, 63 
we discuss how this approach can be applied usefully to pain, exploring both the 64 
research and clinical implications of embodied pain.  65 
 66 
2. Inferring experience in an uncertain world 67 
In proposing a view of pain as embodied and embedded, we draw upon three principles 68 
from the broader literature on embodied experience: inference, liminality, and defence. 69 
First, all experience is inferred, and inference functions principally to maintain 70 
coherence in complex and inherently uncertain environments—inference. Second, all 71 
experience is fundamentally defined by the boundaries of possible action—liminality. 72 
Third, all experience can be disturbed by bodily threat: pain is an action that functions 73 
to reduce threat; promoting defence and maintaining the integrity of coherent 74 
behaviour—defence. 75 
 76 
2.1. Inference 77 
4 
 
We know now that our experiences are inferred [47, 89]: we fill in the gaps [44], 78 
selectively attend [1,31], unconsciously prime [10,50], and in essence prioritise 79 
efficiency over accuracy [52,94]. Perception results from attempts to accommodate 80 
information that has deviated from our predictions [20]. It is only through the actions of 81 
our body and our predictions of the consequences of these actions that we are able to 82 
disambiguate the world [39]. Thus, the reciprocal relationship between action and 83 
prediction continually reshapes our experience of pain.  84 
 85 
Perception as inference can be characterised computationally [103], and has been 86 
explored in pain [3,17,61]. Critically, however, the role of the body is often relegated in 87 
these more reductionist models, overshadowed by the dominant view of pain as a 88 
phenomenon of the brain [99]. In contrast, experience from an embodied perspective 89 
is borne out of the hierarchical, sensorimotor interactions we have with the world 90 
[40,73,74]. Importantly, this accounts for the changing ability of the individual to act in 91 
their environment, as well as what the environment affords. When pain is included 92 
within this sensorimotor interaction, it can be considered an action that deliberately 93 
alters the way in which we are able to interact with our environment and so in turn, 94 
changes what the environment affords. 95 
 96 
2.2. Liminality 97 
Experience can be thought of as a strategy generated from the need to continually 98 
adjust our actions when our predictions emerge as inadequate, i.e.,  a mismatch that 99 
does not provide a coherent basis for action [23,51]. The need for homeostatic 100 
coherence above all else drives experience [9,25,81]. Pain, along with other bodily 101 
experiences (e.g. fatigue, itch, temperature, pressure and disequilibrium) that intrude 102 
upon awareness indicate that boundaries have been reached and action must be 103 




2.3 Defence 106 
Much of the active inference we describe occurs outside of awareness. Like a stream 107 
following a well-worn channel defined by natural banks that guide and constrain, so 108 
felt experience flows largely uninterrupted, embodied by physical constraints and 109 
embedded within social constraints. To stray outside of these bounds produces 110 
specific alerts that function to modify our actions or alter our predictions. Each physical 111 
sense has a specific threat tied to specific defensive actions, which attempt to return 112 
the individual to within viable constraints [28].  113 
 114 
In some circumstances those defensive actions are insufficient and the result is 115 
experienced as disturbing, e.g., das unheimliche phenomena in which we experience 116 
incoherent perceptions of familiarity; an illusion of relationship, in which objects are 117 
uncannily personal [38]. When all defensive actions fail there emerge whole system 118 
delusional experiences, including repression, de-realization, and—as the final 119 
defence—dissociation [12,13,58]. 120 
 121 
3. Embodied pain motivating action 122 
First we review research on how pain influences non-pain perceptual judgement, and 123 
the obverse- inference. Second, we consider studies of action constrained when it 124 
meets the boundaries imposed by the body in pain, studied as illusions that alter the 125 
experience of pain- liminal. Third, we consider examples of whole body disturbances 126 
for their accounting of pain, studied as specific experiences of pain related 127 
dissociation, or global experiences of delusion, in a final defence by departure-128 
defence. 129 
 130 
There is a small body of experimental work on how the experience of pain can alter 131 
non-pain perception. For example, we have shown that pain affects judgements of 132 
distance when the object-distance being judged is threat-related [91], an observation 133 
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previously made in patients with clinical pain [102]. Similarly, pain can affect 134 
judgements of the weight of external objects [90], and the weight, size, and shape of 135 
one’s own body [67,69]. Clinically, reports of pain, temperature, stiffness, and 136 
imbalance are hard to disentangle, so often appear together [68], and have yet to be 137 
experimentally separated. Without such finesse, attempts to capture embodied 138 
experience rightly faces scrutiny and challenge [37]; although studies have replicated 139 
the effects of higher order cognition and mood on pain [11,92]. There are also studies 140 
of counter-stimulation offered in competition to pain as distraction [59]. Evidence from 141 
direct experimental studies conducted shows pain to be dynamic, flexible, and 142 
connected; a reflection of inference in an uncertain world. 143 
 144 
Illusionary experience goes beyond altered sensory judgements. ‘Illusionary’ is 145 
normally judged as impossible or improbable perception based on a common 146 
agreement on the world; for example, if I perceive a limb that every external observer 147 
knows me to have lost. Painful missing body parts are a common experience for 148 
amputees [72], although they are rarely reported in isolation from temperature, 149 
pressure, weight, size and itch phenomena. Visual counter-stimulation using mirrors 150 
or virtual reality can alter aspects of size, position, and ownership, but also pain 151 
[15,60,76]. Some illusions may be harder to identify than others. For example, patients 152 
with osteoarthritis demonstrate an altered sensorimotor relationship with the affected 153 
limb in addition to the experience of pain [43,87,88]. Evidence from studies of 154 
illusionary physical experience can be seen usefully as examples of pain operating as 155 
a liminal phenomenon, unstable and malleable. 156 
 157 
Embodied pain involves an elision between perception and action, such that pain 158 
without action should be considered unusual, abnormal, or extreme. From this 159 
perspective, chronic pain involves persistent action that attempts to reduce threat over 160 
time. Inescapable pain, where action is inadequate, may be a signal feature of severe 161 
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distress eg., total pain, or locked in syndrome) [7]. At risk in inescapable pain is the 162 
coherence of all behaviour. There are studies of altered bodily coherence in individuals 163 
with CRPS I [67] and observations of dissociation from ownership of a limb [57]. But 164 
there are few experimental studies of what can be considered a final defence by 165 
departure, in repression, de-realization, or dissociation. In anthropology there are 166 
qualitative accounts of specific rites of passage [65], and in social psychology of 167 
deviant social practice [8]. In the history of medicine we find rich description of 168 
inescapable surgical pain without anaesthesia [14] and in contemporary medicine 169 
there are similar accounts, such as in emergency care, or burns care [66]. There is no 170 
meta-synthesis of this literature, however, accounts of inescapable pain—of pain 171 
denied action—all feature what we call a final defence in a dissociative departure from 172 
our body. Although these departures are well studied in clinical neurology, and so have 173 
a structure [54] they have not been studied in pain. Evidence from studies of final 174 
defence show that only in extreme circumstances does perception cleave from action. 175 
 176 
4. Discussion 177 
Pain as embodied and embedded—inferred, liminal, and functioning for defence—has 178 
far reaching research and clinical implications (Fig. 1.). Our focus should shift from 179 
pain as a passive, sensory experience to pain as a dynamic, motor experience. Pain 180 
is always about action [96].  181 
 182 
For research, our focus should be on the critical gaps. First, there is a need to explore 183 
the changing interactions between experience of the body and associated action 184 
(conscious and non-conscious). Studies of proprioception [45], peri-personal space 185 
[79], and bodily size [68] have offered the best entry points, but a programme of 186 
research into other liminal bodily experiences, such as itch, fatigue, disequilibrium, and 187 





Fig. 1. Embodied Pain: proposed research and clinical agendas. 191 
 192 
The clinical study of treatments aimed at altering experience should consider actions 193 
associated with threat. In part, this approach is concerned with gaining detailed 194 
accounts of real-life interactions. In acute pain, there are unexplored opportunities in 195 
going beyond simple distraction, making use of the inherent uncertainty associated 196 
with our bodily experiences; recognising that we act continually to reduce uncertainty. 197 
This line of work is already being pursued with the use of bodily illusions [45,71,76]. In 198 
chronic pain, interesting are e-health and m-health innovations that now allow for 199 
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moment-by-moment measurement of functional, physiological and experiential 200 
parameters in the real word. Clinically, treatments framed within a motivational context 201 
of how pain interferes with purposeful goal-orientated behaviour (e.g, completing a 202 
work task)  may be improved by studying how threat to bodily coherence is managed 203 
[16,80]. In particular, accounting for how action and prediction influence individually 204 
defined boundaries. We are beginning to think of therapy as the attempt to redefine a 205 
stable coherence of one’s identity in line with the context of a persistent urge for 206 
defence [66].  207 
 208 
5. Conclusion 209 
We propose that pain is inescapably embodied and embedded; an action that reflects 210 
the uncertainty of body and world. ‘Embodied pain’ provides a theoretical platform from 211 
which novel investigations can aim to understand coherent action in complex, goal-212 
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